Tenth Circuit Finds that Policy Terms in an ERISA Plan Did Not Unequivocally Grant an ERISA Administrator Discretion to Interpret Plan Terms, Applies De Novo Review

Insurance companies acting as ERISA plan administrators often are guilty of abusing their discretion to interpret policy language related to the level of benefits payable to a claimant under a long-term disability (“LTD”) policy in a manner most beneficial to them, rather than the claimant.  In a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hodges v. Life Insurance Company of North America, 920 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 2019), the court addressed the ability of insurance companies such as Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) from interpreting policy language that may determine the level of benefits payable to a claimant.

In Hodges, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the district court that LINA failed to meet its burden to show it was entitled to deference in deciding who qualified as “Sales Personnel” and who did not under a group LTD policy issued to Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  The policy language did not give the Plan Administrator the authority to interpret the meaning of Sales Personnel yet LINA did so, depriving the claimant of thousands of dollars in benefits.

Lou Hodges was a cryotherapy technician for Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Endo”) until he was forced to retire due to a degenerative eye condition in 2012.  Hodges was insured under Endo’s group LTD insurance policy which was part of its ERISA Plan, administered by LINA.  The Policy divided Endo’s employees into two classes:  Class I employees included “all active, Full-time and part-time Employees of the Employer, excluding Sales Personnel, regularly working a minimum of 20 hours per week.”  Class 2 employees included “all active, Full-time Employees of the Employer classified as Sales Personnel regularly working a minimum of 20 hours per week.”

The policy entitled all Class 1 and Class 2 employees to monthly LTD benefits of 60% of their average pre-disability earnings, but defined the earnings of Class 2 Sales Personnel far more broadly than non-Sales Personnel.  The definition of earnings for all Class 2 Sales Personnel included payments “received from bonuses or target incentive compensation bonus[es].”

In evaluating Hodges’s claim for LTD benefits, although concluding he was medically eligible, LINA sought information on his job description and duties from both Hodges and his employer, Endo, to determine whether he qualified as Class 2 “Sales Personnel” for determining the level of benefits to which he was entitled.  LINA informed Hodges his claim for benefits was approved but that they deemed him a Class 1 employee.  This meant a much lower amount of benefits would be paid to Hodges because he would not be able to include his bonus and/or incentive compensation in LINA’s calculation of 60% of his pre-disability income.

Hodges challenged LINA’s determination, appealing twice.  After the denial of his second appeal, Hodges filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.  In February 2017, the district court concluded the policy failed to reserve LINA discretion to decide employee-classification questions and remanded the case for LINA to conduct further fact finding on Hodges’s employment classification.  On remand, LINA again determined that Hodges was a Class 1 employee, relying upon a statement from Endo’s Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel.

After Hodges asked the district court to reopen the case, in June 2018 it ruled that LINA had once again failed to adequately investigate Hodges’s employment classification.  Concluding that a second remand would be futile, the district court determined that Hodges was a salesperson under the ordinary meaning of that term, reversed LINA’s contrary decision, and awarded Hodges Class 2 benefits.

Upon appeal by LINA, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Hodges indeed qualified as a Class 2 Sales Personnel employee due to his responsibilities to sell and promote Endo’s commercial products and services at every available juncture; to sell doctors on performing more cryotherapy procedures; to assist in the growth and development of existing and new business lines, to market the technology and submit a minimum of one lead a month for new cryotherapy users, new applications for existing cryotherapy users, or any other lead for any of Endo’s business.

The Tenth Circuit based its decision on a lack of discretionary authority granted to LINA in construing the terms of the plan.  The Tenth Circuit noted that it reviews de novo a plan administrator’s denial of benefits “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”  Hodges, 920 F.3d at 675 citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  However, the court considered whether the plan granted discretion to determine whether or not benefits were payable in accordance with the terms of the policy.  The court acknowledged that plans which contain clear and unambiguous discretion-conveying language afford the court the ability to grant discretion over all decisions that arise in the claims process.  Here, however, the court found that nothing in the policy granted LINA the discretion to conclude who qualified as a salesperson under the plan, and noted that thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court’s holding in Firestone.  Thus, plan drafters have had ample time to include language giving discretion if they so desired.

Turning to the issue of whether Hodges qualified as a salesperson, the record reflected that Hodges received a significant portion of his income from bonuses when he did sell products and services and those earnings were designated as bonuses on his pay stubs.  Hodges received $3,000 for every $100,000 of pathology work that a doctor performed using Endo’s equipment and services and a monthly bonus for every case he worked on.  The Tenth Circuit found that these substantial sales responsibilities and sales driven compensation would cause a reasonable person such as Hodges to believe he was a salesperson and devote his efforts to sales to increase his compensation.   In addition, although he derived a majority of his compensation from performing cryotherapy services, he could not continue cryotherapy services without selling the company’s products.

The Court of Appeal’s ruling resulted in a higher level of LTD benefits payable to Hodges than he would have received had the Court determined the plan administrator had discretionary authority to interpret policy definitions regarding employee job classifications.  This set an important precedent that without the clear and unambiguous authority to do so, a plan administrator does not have the discretionary authority to interpret policy language related to an employee’s job classification that would negatively affect his or her level of benefits payable under an ERISA Plan.

Hodges’s case against LINA reveals that skilled and aggressive legal representation is often necessary if you have any concerns regarding an ERISA plan administrator’s interpretation of a long-term disability policy under which you are insured and the level of disability benefits payable to you.  Insurers are notorious for interpreting policy language in their favor in order to protect their own financial interests, to the detriment of ERISA claimants and in conscious disregard of their rights.

 

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